When was platos republic written

But if the disparagements do not express any considered views about the nature of women, then we might be able to conclude that Plato is deeply prejudiced against women and yet committed to some plausibly feminist principles. But it is worth thinking through the various ways in which this charge might be made, to clarify the way the philosopher-rulers wield political authority over the rest of the city see Bambrough , Taylor , L.

Brown , and Ackrill Socrates is quite explicit that the good at which the rulers aim is the unity of the city a—b. Is this an inherently totalitarian and objectionable aim? The problem, Popper and others have charged, is that the rulers aim at the organic unity of the city as a whole, regardless of the individual interests of the citizens.

But this would be surprising, if true. So how could the rulers of Kallipolis utterly disregard the good of the citizens? Some readers answer Popper by staking out a diametrically opposed position Vlastos Any totalitarian control of the citizens is paternalistic. Yet this view, too, seems at odds with much of the Republic.

So a mixed interpretation seems to be called for Morrison ; cf. Kamtekar , Meyer , and Brennan On this view, if the citizens do not see themselves as parts of the city serving the city, neither the city nor they will be maximally happy. But it is not obvious that the rulers of Kallipolis have inherently totalitarian and objectionable aims cf.

Kamtekar Kallipolis has more clearly totalitarian features. First, totalitarian regimes concentrate political power in one bloc and offer the ruled no alternative. But the concentration of political power in Kallipolis differs in at least two ways from the concentration in actual totalitarian states. First, Socrates insists that in the ideal city, all the citizens will agree about who should rule. Socrates also suggests some ways of explaining how the non-philosophers will agree that the philosophers should rule.

First, he offers a way of persuading those who lack knowledge that only the philosophers have knowledge d—a , which in effect offers a way of explaining to the non-philosophers that only the philosophers have the knowledge required to rule. Their virtue would be especially striking to the producers, since the philosophers do without private property, which the producers love so much.

Finally, he suggests that in Kallipolis, the producers will be grateful to the guardian classes for keeping the city safe and orderly, wherein they can achieve their good, as they see it, by optimally satisfying their necessary appetitive attitudes a—b. Socrates is clear that the philosophers despise political power c, a , and they rule not to reap rewards but for the sake of the ruled cf. In fact, the rulers of Kallipolis benefit the ruled as best they can, helping them realize the best life they are capable of.

These benefits must include some primary education for the producer class see d , to make good on the commitment to promote especially talented children born among the producers c, d and to enable the producers to recognize the virtue in the philosophers.

But the benefits extend to peace and order: the producers do not have to face warfare. A second totalitarian feature of Kallipolis is the control that the rulers exert over daily life. There is nothing especially totalitarian about the rule of law pervasive in Kallipolis see esp.

This propagandistic control plainly represents a totalitarian concern, and it should make us skeptical about the value of the consent given to the rulers of Kallipolis. It is one thing to identify totalitarian features of Kallipolis and another thing to say why they are wrong. Three very different objections suggest themselves. First, we might reject the idea of an objectively knowable human good, and thus reject the idea that political power should be in the hands of those who know the human good.

At least, it does not seem implausible to suppose that some general psychological capacities are objectively good for their possessors while others are objectively bad , and at that point, we can ask whether political power should be used to foster the good capacities and to restrain or prevent the bad ones.

Given that state-sponsored education cannot but address the psychological capacities of the pupils, only very austere political systems could be supported by a thorough-going skepticism about the human good. Second, we might accept the idea of an objectively knowable human good, but be wary of concentrating extensive political power in the hands of a few knowers.

If this is our objection, then we might wonder what checks are optimal. This sort of response is perhaps the most interesting, but it is by no means easy. For it is difficult to assess the intrinsic value of self-determination and free expression, apart from skepticism about the knowledge or power of those who would limit self-determination or free expression.

Moreover, it is difficult to balance these values against the concerns that motivate Plato. Where does the power over massive cultural forces lie when it is not under political control? And to what extent can we live well when our culture is not shaped by people thoughtfully dedicated to living a good human life?

These are not questions that can be easily shrugged off, even if we cannot embrace Kallipolis as their answer. The best human life is ruled by knowledge and especially knowledge of what goodness is and of what is good for human beings. So, too, is the best city. For Plato, philosophers make the ideal rulers for two main reasons. First, they know what is good. Second, they do not want to rule esp. The problem with existing cities is correspondingly twofold. They are ruled by people who are ignorant of what is good, and they suffer from strife among citizens all of whom want to rule.

These flaws are connected: the ignorant are marked by their desire for the wrong objects, such as honor and money, and this desire is what leads them to seek political power. All existing regimes, whether ruled by one, a few, or many, show these defects. Aristotle, Politics III 7. Nonetheless, Socrates has much to say in Books Eight and Nine about the individual character of various defective regimes. In the timocracy, for example, nothing checks the rulers from taking money to be a badge of honor and feeding their appetites, which grow in private until they cannot be hidden anymore.

The account is thus deeply informed by psychology. The account, psychologically and historically informed, does not offer any hint of psychological or historical determinism. Socrates does not identify the transitions from one defective regime to the next as inevitable, and he explicitly allows for transitions other than the ones he highlights.

This is just one story one could tell about defective regimes. The political psychology of Books Eight and Nine raises a host of questions, especially about the city-soul analogy see section 1. Is the account of political change dependent upon the account of psychological change, or vice versa?

Or if this is a case of mutual interdependence, exactly what accounts for the various dependencies? It seems difficult to give just one answer to these questions that will explain all of the claims in these books, and the full, complex theory that must underlie all of the claims is by no means clear. But those questions should not obscure the political critiques that Socrates offers.

First, he criticizes the oligarchs of Athens and Sparta. His list of five regimes departs from the usual list of rule by one, rule by a few, and rule by many cf.

Socrates argues that these are not genuine aristocracies, because neither timocracy nor oligarchy manages to check the greed that introduces injustice and strife into cities. This highlights the deficiencies of the Spartan oligarchy, with its narrow attention to valor cf. Laws , esp. Books One and Two , and of the Athenian oligarchs, many of whom pursued their own material interests narrowly, however much they eyed Sparta as a model.

So the Republic distances Plato from oligarchic parties of his time and place. Second, Socrates criticizes the Athenian democracy, as Adeimantus remarks d.

Many readers think that Socrates goes over the top in his description, but the central message is not so easy to dismiss. Socrates argues that without some publicly entrenched standards for evaluation guiding the city, chaos and strife are unavoidable.

Even the timocracy and oligarchy, for all their flaws, have public standards for value. But democracy honors all pursuits equally, which opens the city to conflict and disorder.

Some readers find a silver lining in this critique. But the Republic also records considerable skepticism about democratic tolerance of philosophers a—a, cf.

I doubt that Socrates explicit ranking in the Republic should count for less than some imagined implicit ranking, but we might still wonder what to make of the apparent contrast between the Republic and Statesman. Perhaps the difference is insignificant, since both democracies and oligarchies are beset by the same essential strife between the rich oligarchs and poor democrats e—a.

Perhaps, too, the Republic and Statesman appear to disagree only because Plato has different criteria in view. Or perhaps he just changed his mind. The ideal city of the Laws , which Plato probably wrote shortly after the Statesman , accords a greater political role for unwise citizens than the Republic does see Plato: on utopia. The Republic is a sprawling work with dazzling details and an enormously wide-ranging influence. But what, in the end, does the work say to us, insofar as we are trying to live well or help our society live well, and what does it say to us, insofar as we are trying to understand how to think about how to live well?

But the Republic characterizes philosophy differently. First, it goes much further than the Socratic dialogues in respecting the power of passions and desires. Wisdom still requires being able to survive Socratic examination b—c , but it also explicitly requires careful and extensive habituation of spirited and appetitive attitudes a—b, a8—b1 , sublimation of psychological energy from spirited and appetitive desires to philosophical desire cf.

Second, as opposed to the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues, who avows ignorance and is content with the belief that the world is well-ordered, the Socrates of the Republic insists that wisdom requires understanding how the world is, which involves apprehending the basic mathematical and teleological structure of things. Third, although the Socrates of the Socratic dialogues practices philosophy instead of living an ordinarily engaged political life, he insists that his life is closer to what the political art demands than the ordinarily engaged life is.

According to the Republic , by contrast, the philosopher prefers to be entirely apart from politics, especially in ordinary circumstances c—e, a, cf.

One facet of this advice that deserves emphasizing is the importance it places on the influence of others. This is most obvious in the case of those who cannot pursue wisdom for themselves.

They will live as well as those who lead them allow. But even those who can pursue wisdom must first be raised well and must later meet with tolerance, which philosophers do not often receive. The ethical theory the Republic offers is best characterized as eudaimonist, according to which a person should act for the sake of his or her own success or happiness eudaimonia.

Socrates does not argue for this as opposed to other approaches to ethics. This eudaimonism is widely thought to be an egoistic kind of consequentialism: one should act so as to bring about states of affairs in which one is happy or successful. If the Republic takes this identity seriously, as the function argument of Book One does a , it says that virtuous activity is good not because it brings about success, but because it is success.

Metaethically, the Republic presupposes that there are objective facts concerning how one should live. Much of its account of these facts sounds naturalist. After all, Socrates uses the careful study of human psychology to reveal how our souls function well or ill, and he grounds the account of what a person should do in his understanding of good psychological functioning.

Whether this is plausible depends upon what careful study of human psychology in fact shows. It depends in particular on whether, as a matter of fact, the actions that we would pre-theoretically deem good sustain a coherent set of psychological commitments and those that we would pre-theoretically deem bad are inconsistent with a coherent set of psychological commitments. Ethical naturalism such as this still awaits support from psychology, but it has not been falsified, either.

Although this naturalist reading of the Republic is not anachronistic—Aristotle and the Stoics develop related naturalist approaches, and Plato had naturalist contemporaries in a hedonist tradition—Plato himself would not be content to ground his account of good actions on empirical facts of human psychology. On his view, actions are good because of their relation to good agents, and agents are good because of their relation to goodness itself. But goodness itself, the Good, transcends the natural world; it is a supernatural property.

But non-naturalism in ethics will retain some appeal insofar as the other ways of trying to explain our experiences of the moral life fail to answer the serious objections they face. In the sections above, I take what Socrates says about the ideal and defective cities at face value, but many readers believe that this is a mistake. Some think that Plato does not intend the Republic as a serious contribution to political thought, because its political musings are projections to clarify psychological claims crucial to the ethical theory that Plato does seriously intend Annas , Annas Moreover, one can concede that the Republic calls into question many of its political proposals without thinking that Plato means to cancel them or suggest other, radically different political advice cf.

Clay It is striking that Socrates is ready to show that it is better to be just than unjust before he has even said that the just and wise person must be a philosopher and that the just city must be ruled by philosophers e—a. And it is striking that Socrates recognizes that Greeks would ridicule his proposal that women take up the arts of war a.

But Plato might signal for his readers to examine and re-examine what Socrates says without thereby suggesting that he himself finds fault with what Socrates says. But still some readers, especially Leo Strauss see Strauss and his followers e. First, they note that the philosophers have to be compelled to rule the ideal city.

But this involves no impossibility. The founders of the ideal city would have to make a law compelling those educated as philosophers to rule cf.

If philosophers have to be compelled to sustain the maximally happy city, one might wonder why anyone would found such a city. But one might wonder why anyone was inspired to compose the Oresteia , as well. People sometimes do remarkable things. After all, Socrates does not say that eros makes the creation or maintenance of Kallipolis impossible. Finally, the Straussians note that Kallipolis is not sketched as an ideal in a political treatise, exactly, but proposed by Socrates in a long dramatic conversation, which includes twists and turns that come after he stops discussing Kallipolis.

This is true, and it renders difficult inferences from what is said in the Republic to what Plato thinks. But it does not provide any reason for thinking that Plato rejects the ideal that Socrates constructs in the Republic.

In fact, Socrates expresses several central political theses in the Republic that appear in other Platonic dialogues, as well, especially in the Gorgias , Statesman , and Laws. First, the best rulers are wise. Second, the best rulers rule for the benefit of the ruled, and not for their own sake.

Third, a city is highly unlikely to have the best rulers, in part because there is a gulf between the values of most people and the values of the wise.

Fourth, the greatest harm to a city is disagreement about who should rule, since competing factions create civil strife. So, fifth, a central goal of politics is harmony or agreement among the citizens about who should rule. Last, harmony requires that the city cultivate virtue and the rule of law. The standard edition of the Greek text is Slings The full Greek text also appears with an excellent commentary in Adam Good translations into current English include Allen , Bloom , Grube , Reeve , and especially Rowe , but Shorey — also holds up well.

See especially Annas , Bobonich , Irwin , Klosko , Mackenzie , Monoson , Pradeau , Samaras , Schofield , and Vasiliou , and the relevant essays collected in Benson and Fine Readers wondering about the context in which the Republic was written will find an excellent introduction in Ferrari I have sprinkled throughout the essay references to a few other works that are especially relevant not always by agreement!

For an excellent bibliographical guide that is much more thorough than this, see Ferrari The author thanks Ryan Balot, Richard Kraut, Casey Perin, and Eric Wiland for their comments on an early draft, and the many readers of the earlier versions, some anonymous, who sent suggestions for improvement. Introduction: The Question and the Strategy 1. Politics, Part Two: Defective Constitutions 6. Politics, Part Two: Defective Constitutions The best human life is ruled by knowledge and especially knowledge of what goodness is and of what is good for human beings.

Works Cited Ackrill, J. NB that this essay only appears in the paperback edition, issued in without any notice of a second edition or fresh copyright. Adam, J. Adkins, A. Allen, R. Annas, J. Reprinted in Fine , — Witt and M. Matthen eds. Austin, E. Balot, R. Bambrough, R. Barney, R. Benson, H. Blackburn, S. Bloom, A. Bobonich, C. Reprinted in Wagner , — Brennan, T. Brown, E. Brown, L. Buchan, M. Burnyeat, M. Hopkins and A. Savile eds. Peterson ed. Carone, G.

Carter, L. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Clay, D. Griswold, Jr. Cooper, J. Reprinted in Cooper , — Reprinted in Cooper , pp. Reprinted in Cooper , 76— Cornelli, G. Lisi eds. Cross, R. Dahl, N. Demos, R. Reprinted in Vlastos , 52— Dover, K. Ferrari, G. Ferrari ed. Griffith trans. Fine, G. Foster, M. Ganson, T. Gill, C. Gosling, J. Griswold, C. Grube, G. Reeve, Indianapolis: Hackett. Hitchcock, D. Hitz, Z. Irwin, T. Jeon, H. Johnstone, M.

Kahn, C. Kamtekar, R. Reprinted in Barney et al. Kenny, A. Reprinted in A. Keyt, D. Miller, Jr. Kirwan, C. Klosko, G. Kraut, R. Reprinted in Kraut , — Lear, J.

Reprinted in Wagner ,— Levin, S. Ward ed. Lorenz, H. Mabbott, J. Revised in Vlastos , 57— Mackenzie, M. McPherran, M. Marshall, M. Mayhew, R. Menn, S. Meyer, S. Moline, J. Revised in J. Monoson, S. Morrison, D. Moss, J. Murphy, N. Nettleship, R.

Notomi, N. Brisson eds. The second half of the 5th century BCE was a tumultuous period in Athens. Yet it was also a period in which the Athenian polis experienced a rapid decline. In his Republic, Plato describes an ideal City in which a wise philosopher such as Socrates about to be executed by Athens, here would rule.

Scholars concur that Plato authored 36 dialogues. The Republic is encyclopediac, addressing in great depth and with wide reach the domains and spheres of philosophy, from education, to ethics, to politics, and beyond. This is so that the parents think of all the children as their own.

Socrates recognizes that this system will result in members of the same family having intercourse with each other c-e. Socrates proceeds to argue that these arrangements will ensure that unity spreads throughout the city ad. Thereafter, Socrates discusses how the guardians will conduct war e.

Glaucon interrupts him and demands an account explaining how such a just city can come into being c-e. Socrates admits that this is the most difficult criticism to address a. Then he explains that the theoretical model of the just city they constructed remains valid for discussing justice and injustice even if they cannot prove that such a city can come to exist bb.

Socrates claims that the model of the just city cannot come into being until philosophers rule as kings or kings become philosophers c-d. He also points out that this is the only possible route by which to reach complete happiness in both public and private life e.

Socrates indicates that they to, discuss philosophy and philosophers to justify these claims b-c. Philosophers love and pursue all of wisdom b-c and they especially love the sight of truth e. Philosophers are the only ones who recognize and find pleasure in what is behind the multiplicity of appearances, namely the single Form a-b.

Socrates distinguishes between those who know the single Forms that are and those who have opinions d. Those who have opinions do not know, since opinions have becoming and changing appearances as their object, whereas knowledge implies that the objects thereof are stable ee. Socrates goes on to explain why philosophers should rule the city.

They should do so since they are better able to know the truth and since they have the relevant practical knowledge by which to rule. Adeimantus objects that actual philosophers are either useless or bad people a-d. Socrates responds with the analogy of the ship of state to show that philosophers are falsely blamed for their uselessness ea.

Like a doctor who does not beg patients to heal them, the philosopher should not plead with people to rule them b-c. Thus, someone can only be a philosopher in the true sense if he receives the proper kind of education. After a discussion of the sophists as bad teachers ac , Socrates warns against various people who falsely claim to be philosophers b-c. Since current political regimes lead to either the corruption or the destruction of the philosopher, he should avoid politics and lead a quiet private life c-d.

Socrates then addresses the question of how philosophy can come to play an important role in existing cities e. Those with philosophical natures need to practice philosophy all their lives, especially when they are older a-c. The only way to make sure that philosophy is properly appreciated and does not meet hostility is to wipe an existing city clean and begin it anew a.

Socrates concludes that the just city and the measures proposed are both for the best and not impossible to bring about c. Socrates proceeds to discuss the education of philosopher kings c-d. The most important thing philosophers should study is the Form of the Good a.

Socrates considers several candidates for what the Good is, such as pleasure and knowledge and he rejects them b-d. He points out that we choose everything with a view to the good e. Socrates attempts to explain what the Form of the Good is through the analogy of the sun cd. As the sun illuminates objects so the eye can see them, the Form of the Good renders the objects of knowledge knowable to the human soul.

As the sun provides things with their ability to be, to grow, and with nourishment, the Form of the Good provides the objects of knowledge with their being even though it itself is higher than being b. Socrates offers the analogy of the divided line to explain the Form of the Good even further dd.

He divides a line into two unequal sections once and then into two unequal sections again. The lowest two parts represent the visible realm and the top two parts the intelligible realm. Corresponding to each of these, there is a capacity of the human soul: imagination, belief, thought, and understanding. The line also represents degrees of clarity and opacity as the lowest sections are more opaque and the higher sections clearer.

Socrates continues his discussion of the philosopher and the Forms with a third analogy, the analogy of the cave ac. True education is the turning around of the soul from shadows and visible objects to true understanding of the Forms c-d. Philosophers who accomplish this understanding will be reluctant to do anything other than contemplate the Forms but they must be forced to return to the cave the city and rule it.

Those who eventually become philosopher kings will initially be educated like the other guardians in poetry, music, and physical education d-e.

Then they will receive education in mathematics: arithmetic and number c , plane geometry c , and solid geometry b. Following these, they will study astronomy e , and harmonics d.

Then they will study dialectic which will lead them to understand the Forms and the Form of the Good a. Socrates gives a partial explanation of the nature of dialectic and leaves Glaucon with no clear explanation of its nature or how it may lead to understanding aa. Then they discuss who will receive this course of education and how long they are to study these subjects ab.

The ones receiving this type of education need to exhibit the natural abilities suited to a philosopher discussed earlier.

After the training in dialectic the education system will include fifteen years of practical political training ec to prepare philosopher kings for ruling the city. Socrates concludes by suggesting that the easiest way to bring the just city into being would be to expel everyone over the age of ten out of an existing city eb.

Socrates picks up the argument that was interrupted in Book V. Glaucon remembers that Socrates was about to describe the four types of unjust regime along with their corresponding unjust individuals cb. Socrates announces that he will begin discussing the regimes and individual that deviate the least from the just city and individual and proceed to discuss the ones that deviate the most b-c. The cause of change in regime is lack of unity in the rulers d. Assuming that the just city could come into being, Socrates indicates that it would eventually change since everything which comes into being must decay a-b.

The rulers are bound to make mistakes in assigning people jobs suited to their natural capacities and each of the classes will begin to be mixed with people who are not naturally suited for the tasks relevant to each class e. This will lead to class conflicts a. The first deviant regime from just kingship or aristocracy will be timocracy, that emphasizes the pursuit of honor rather than wisdom and justice d ff. The timocratic individual will have a strong spirited part in his soul and will pursue honor, power, and success a.

This city will be militaristic. Oligarchy arises out of timocracy and it emphasizes wealth rather than honor c-e. Socrates discusses how it arises out of timocracy and its characteristics ce : people will pursue wealth; it will essentially be two cities, a city of wealthy citizens and a city of poor people; the few wealthy will fear the many poor; people will do various jobs simultaneously; the city will allow for poor people without means; it will have a high crime rate.

The oligarchic individual comes by seeing his father lose his possessions and feeling insecure he begins to greedily pursue wealth a-c.

Thus he allows his appetitive part to become a more dominant part of his soul c. Socrates proceeds penultimately, to discuss democracy. It comes about when the rich become too rich and the poor too poor c-d. Too much luxury makes the oligarchs soft and the poor revolt against them c-e. In democracy most of the political offices are distributed by lot a.

The primary goal of the democratic regime is freedom or license b-c. People will come to hold offices without having the necessary knowledge e and everyone is treated as an equal in ability equals and unequals alike, c. The democratic individual comes to pursue all sorts of bodily desires excessively dd and allows his appetitive part to rule his soul. He comes about when his bad education allows him to transition from desiring money to desiring bodily and material goods d-e.

The democratic individual has no shame and no self-discipline d. Tyranny arises out of democracy when the desire for freedom to do what one wants becomes extreme b-c.

Socrates points out that when freedom is taken to such an extreme it produces its opposite, slavery ea. The tyrant comes about by presenting himself as a champion of the people against the class of the few people who are wealthy da.

The tyrant is forced to commit a number of acts to gain and retain power: accuse people falsely, attack his kinsmen, bring people to trial under false pretenses, kill many people, exile many people, and purport to cancel the debts of the poor to gain their support ea.

The tyrant eliminates the rich, brave, and wise people in the city since he perceives them as threats to his power c. Socrates indicates that the tyrant faces the dilemma to either live with worthless people or with good people who may eventually depose him and chooses to live with worthless people d. The tyrant ends up using mercenaries as his guards since he cannot trust any of the citizens d-e.

Socrates is now ready to discuss the tyrannical individual a. He begins by discussing necessary and unnecessary pleasures and desires b-c. Those with balanced souls ruled by reason are able to keep their unnecessary desires from becoming lawless and extreme db. The tyrannical person is mad with lust c and this leads him to seek any means by which to satisfy his desires and to resist anyone who gets in his way dd. Some tyrannical individuals eventually become actual tyrants b-d. Tyrants associate themselves with flatterers and are incapable of friendship ea.

Applying the analogy of the city and the soul, Socrates proceeds to argue that the tyrannical individual is the most unhappy individual c ff. Like the tyrannical city, the tyrannical individual is enslaved c-d , least likely to do what he wants d-e , poor and unsatisfiable ea , fearful and full of wailing and lamenting a. The individual who becomes an actual tyrant of a city is the unhappiest of all ba. Socrates concludes this first argument with a ranking of the individuals in terms of happiness: the more just one is the happier b-c.

He proceeds to a second proof that the just are happier than the unjust d. Socrates distinguishes three types of persons: one who pursues wisdom, another who pursues honor, and another who pursues profit dc. Socrates proceeds to offer a third proof that the just are happier than the unjust b. He begins with an analysis of pleasure: relief from pain may seem pleasant c and bodily pleasures are merely a relief from pain but not true pleasure b-c.

The only truly fulfilling pleasure is that which comes from understanding since the objects it pursues are permanent b-c. Socrates adds that only if the rational part rules the soul, will each part of the soul find its proper pleasure da. He concludes the argument with a calculation of how many times the best life is more pleasant than the worst: seven-hundred and twenty nine ae.

Socrates discusses an imaginary multi-headed beast to illustrate the consequences of justice and injustice in the soul and to support justice c ff. Thereafter, Socrates returns to the subject of poetry and claims that the measures introduced to exclude imitative poetry from the just city seem clearly justified now a. Poetry is to be censored since the poets may not know which is; thus may lead the soul astray b.

Socrates proceeds to discuss imitation. He explains what it is by distinguishing several levels of imitation through the example of a couch: there is the Form of the couch, the particular couch, and a painting of a couch ab.

The products of imitation are far removed from the truth ec. Poets, like painters are imitators who produce imitations without knowledge of the truth ea. Socrates argues that if poets had knowledge of the truth they would want to be people who do great things rather than remain poets b.

Now Socrates considers how imitators affect their audiences c. He uses a comparison with optical illusions c to argue that imitative poetry causes the parts of the soul to be at war with each other and this leads to injustice cb. The most serious charge against imitative poetry is that it even corrupts decent people c.

He concludes that the just city should not allow such poetry in it but only poetry that praises the gods and good humans ea. Imitative poetry prevents the immortal soul from attaining its greatest reward c-d.